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ABSTRACT 
The domain of governance has largely been extolled by Nations, States or governmental and intergovernmental 
actors especially in upholding Nations’ sovereignty and values. While this still holds,  governance complexity has 
been reinforced by establishment of global value chains such as in food and agriculture commodities increasingly 
being influenced and controlled by non-state actors in different parts of the world by both corporate and retail 
actors through private governance mechanisms. These mechanisms often fall short of universal standards and the 
resultant effect is ramified through proliferation of standards that result to state of governance that is constantly 
being redefined as ‘codes of colours’. This paper thus seeks for an alternate dimension based on Foucault’s 
governmentality theory. The quest for this overarching  theory is based on its  mediatory role that regulates the 
excesses of private interests in regulations  while not prioritizing any state’s sovereignty but views governance 
inclusively to both the State and non-state actors; this view promotes the broader understating of global value 
chains in the global economy of the 21
st
 century. The paper’s methodology is based on literature review pertinent 
to  governance theory, value chain governance, governmentality as its key variables in light of the agrifood sector. It 
applies the value chain discourse and governmentatity in light of the Kenya’s Horticultural export  and strategic 
positioning to the EU market. This paper’s novelty in light of the discourse and building on the body of knowledge 
and for the plausible ways and means to re-articulate value chain governance in the global economy while creating 
a viable alternative between the States, and Non-State actors for the benefit of both the upstream agents and 
downstream customers 
Keywords. Value Chain Governance, Governmentality, Horticulture, Private Standards  & Legality 
 
 
1 Introduction  
Governance to inter-firms and institutional relationships is understood as a mechanism through which 
non-market coordination of activities in the chain is achieved (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001). Governance in 
the context of global value chain approach is expressed  in such a way that firms in the chain set or 
enforce the parameter(s) under which others in the chain are to operate. Governance to value chain 
management matters since it serves as the key to market access, expedites on acquisition of production 
capabilities, distribution of goods, leverage on policy initiatives and  aids in formal and technical 
assistance (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001:6); this forms the backdrop to this research under which agrifood 
value chains are evaluated in line with the governance intricacies and akin theories that affect it as it 
fulfils the core objective of customer satisfaction in the globalised economy. From sourcing of food 
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products from various countries of origin to the adoptive strategies adopted by these actors in the wake 
of legal pluralism due to myriad of regulations, standards & accreditations set from the demand side to 
the increased customer sensitivities and quality competition governance is highly involved. An alternate 
dimension based on Foucault’s govermentality theory is in this research proposed to encapsulate the 
varied and complex setting that relates to emerging concerns, trends and typologies in the trajectory of 
agri-food chain governance. This paper proceeds from the expose of the various value chain governance 
typologies in literature and the resultant challenges of legal pluralism; the search for legality in the 
sprawling private regulations is elaborated in light of the standards, accreditation and third party 
certifications sought. A plausible shift from governance to Foucault’s governmentality is explored 
especially as applied by non-state actors that have subtle yet intangible control of the entire supply ch ain 
of given products from the various far removed countries of origin to their destination. Finally, Kenya’s 
Fresh Fruits and Vegetable export sector is evaluated as the case in point for this earmarked shift in value 
chain governance. 
2 Value chain Governance Typologies 
Value chain governance concept has been promoted as consequence of the emergent new approaches to 
supply chain management (SCM) largely based on allocation of resources to core competencies and an 
increased trend towards outsourcing and sub-contracting of non-core functions. This trend has resulted to 
a general loss of control over the stages of production and distribution process especially to 
geographically dispersed regions. Vurro, Russo & Perrini, (2009), led to broadening the concept o f value 
chain governance from inter-firm relationships to global fora due to the coincidence of falling regulatory 
barriers to international trade; advances in communication technologies and declining transportation 
costs.  
The exposition on governance structures and  their different typologies was improved by Gereffi’s  
seminal work (1994, 2001), as based on Williamson’s (1979) economic view of governance through which 
governance was viewed from the extremities of markets and hierarchies. To Gereffi (1994,  2001) the 
typologies of governance were either producer driven or buyer driven; producer driven commodity chains 
are found largely in capital intensive sectors that require a huge capital outlay; while  buyer driven 
governance forms relate to retailers or markets providing the leading role in managing the supply chains. 
The role of the lead firm being the key factor in coordination of activities, goods/services and information 
along the chain (Ponte & Gibbon, 2005; Gibbon, Bair, & Ponte, 2008).   
A further improvement to  the governance concept by Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, (2005) elaborated 
that due the wide range of inter-firms governance types in the global industries; there was the realisation 
of complexity of inter-firms relationships in the global economy. To them, “the key insight is that 
coordination and control of global scale production systems, despite their complexity, can be achieved 
without direct ownership” (Gereffi et al., 2005:81). These authors  thus reviewed governance taking the 
form of coordination compared to the prior view of governance as driver that was  based on the 
understanding of global commodity chains. This nuance  points to the value dimension of the coordination 
as it aims in fulfilling customer needs (Zokaei & Hines, 2007) while improving Williamson’s economic view 
of governance as a form of governance with extremities either by market or by hierarchies; Gereffi et al., 
(2005: 85) added to Williamson’s categories three distinct governance types: modular, relational and 
captive. Consequently, their typology indentified five basic typologies of governance. This typology as we 
have it today is based on  the determinants of: (i) complexity of information and knowledge transfer; (ii) 
codification of information and knowledge transmitted to actors in a transaction, and (iii) the capabilities  
of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements of the transactions. Significant to these 
types of governance structures are the characteristics related to complexity of transactions, ability to 
codify transactions, capability of the supply base and degree of coordination & power asymmetry  (Gereffi 
et al., 2005; Gibbon et al., 2008).  Table 1. summarises these relationship of the various governance types 
and their determinants. 
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Table 1. 
Key Determinants of Global Value Chain Governance 
 Source: (Gereffi et al., 2005: 87) 
Against this background of governance typologies;  global food supply chain systems seem to combine all 
the five governance types. However, Martino & Perugini’s (2006), call for a specified form of  food supply 
chain governance influenced by food quality and safety; this warranted a specified type o f interpretation 
in governance beyond the generic typologies to the subtle attributes related to food safety and quality. 
Food safety and quality is a broad concept that includes physical product attributes as well as process 
attributes. The safety characteristics of a food product are usually classified as corresponding to 
experience, and prevailing credence classes. “...the quality of a product may be known before purchase 
(search good), after purchase (experience good) or only with difficulty even after consumption (Credence 
good)” (Martino & Perugini, 2006:435).  
3 Food Value Chain Governance and Legal Pluralism 
Fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV) export value chains among other agricultural exports have continually 
witnessed rapid changes. Some of the changes have been related to: (i) food safety and assurance 
especially to the developed countries where they were exported to; these changes have renewed the 
need for an elaborate governance system in the entire food value chain specifying the itinerary from the 
country of origin. (ii) Governance concerns have further been precipitated by recent paradigm shift from 
producer driven value chains to demand driven value chains; structural changes related to globalization of 
supply chains hence cutting down on mass production that was not based on demand; (iv) quality based 
competition (Lee, Gereffi, & Beauvais, 2012) and (iv) the emergence of high value commodity good also 
referred to as credence goods have also played a key role in these changes (Reardon, Codron, Busch, 
Bingen, & Harris, 2001) Safety characteristics of a food product are normally classified as corresponding to 
experience, and prevailing credence classes.  
Traditionally, the domain of governance was left to the governmental and intergovernmental actors; while 
this still holds for each state or country (McMahon, 2011), governance of food and agriculture 
commodities on a regional and global level are increasingly becoming influenced and controlled by both 
corporate and retail actors through private governance mechanisms such as quality and safety standards, 
private codes of conduct, ethical trading and appeal to corporate social responsibility. Significantly, retail 
actors have established bodies such as Euro Retailer Produce Working Group for Good Agricultural 
Practice (EurepGAP) and Global Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGAP) (Mausch, Mithöfer, Asfaw, & 
Waibel, 2009) which have imposed private regulations with regulatory protocols relating to pesticide 
residues, field and pack house operations, and traceability (Narrod, Roy, Okello, Avendaño, Rich & Thorat, 
2009; Okello, Narrod, & Roy, 2011) these have been implemented albeit voluntarily to FFV exporters who 
wish to be prequalified to these premier retailing outlets in the developed countries. To these exporters in 
the developing economies, this trend means further implementation of requisite resources and 
infrastructure in order to remain competitive while striving to meet the set certification, standards and 
regulations. 
According to Busch, (2010) standards, play a vital role in the new globalised economy as they often 
replace formal legal frameworks with far more flexible and responsive law-like rules and regulations. To 
Busch (2010): 
These differentiated standards allow firms to discipline suppliers as well as to reduce the 
pressures of price competition…They are market-driven in that the sanctions involved for 
noncompliance are not enforced by the state, but by the market. Yet it is precisely this fact that 
has to date made this form of governance largely invisible (Busch, 2010:67).  
Governance type Complexity of 
Transaction 
Ability to Codify 
transactions 
Capability in the 
supply-base 
Degree of explicit 
coordination and 
power asymmetry 
Market Low High High Low 
Modular High High High  
 
Relational High Low High   
Captive High High Low   
Hierarchy High Low Low High 
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Although standards are hardly sufficient to a new governance regime, effective governa nce through 
standards requires several additional features normally found in legal regimes. These legal regimes are 
characterized by Busch (2010) as Tripartite Standards Regime (TSR) that consist of standards, certification, 
and accreditations. TSR develops a chain of proofs through the process of having standards approved by 
certified bodies and further, these certifying bodies have to be accredited to do the certifications; this 
constitute the TSR regime. Respectively, this is characterized into three certification levels; first level 
involves party certification where the seller certifies to the buyer that the product meets standard. 
Second level certification involves the buyer checking to ensure that the good or service offered by the 
seller meets the standards while third level involves Third-party certification (TPC). TPC involves 
independent agencies doing the checking and reporting to both the buyer and the seller. As the certifiers 
take up their roles, the process of TPC is put to question. How are we to know that a given certifier is 
reliable. The solution is to create bodies that accredit certifier attesting to their conformity to the proper 
standards of the certification (Busch, 2010: 67-68; Hatanaka, Bain, & Busch, 2005); a further ramification 
of the entire process. To Jahn, Schramm, & Spiller, (2005) this process is overtly costly and to Gellynck, 
Verbeke, & Vermeire, (2006) this third party certification process mostly favours procurement agencies in 
their acquisition strategies compared to the ultimate consumer to whom the certification is mostly 
designed. 
Despite the known motivation of the standards, certification and TPC that are aimed in creating  quality 
differentiation, increase consumers’ trust, and reduce exposure to risk of food safety incidents and 
subsequent liability cases (Hobbs, 1996; Anders, Souza-Monteiro, & Rouviere, 2010); the renewed 
challenge within the TSR regime remains to be the challenges of governance in the dawn of food 
globalization. These challenges include (i) proliferation of new international regulatory bodies of 
enormous scope and complexity;(ii) market-based regulatory bodies whose operation has the force of law 
although subtly described in terms of being voluntary standards and (iii) the emergence of institutions 
that are market based and operate on private voluntary standards but are not in the radar of public 
governance; and (iv) increased synergies and competitive global food supply chain operations. 
4 Legitimacy of Private food governance by Standards, Certifications & Accreditation 
In light of Busch's (2011) article on “Food standards: the cacophony of governance”, sets in motion the 
discourse on legality of private food governance. This author situates the discussion on legality by 
contextualising the current scenario that global food chains are faced. 
The current food network is governed by a plethora of standards, laws and regulations that  
reflect (i) differing national and regional histories, (ii) a patch work of strategic  (and sometimes 
conflicting) actions by individual firms and groups of firms, (iii) a general shift away from direct 
State-sponsored regulation, and (iv) differing expectations of consumers (Busch, 2011:1).  
 
While Busch’s work delves in the legality discourse; Mueller, Gomes, & Seuring, (2009) precisely describes 
what makes a rule legitimate. To them, a rule is considered legitimate when the procedure of enforcing 
follows a certain normative requirements. This means that normative legitimacy concept has to fulfill a 
criterion of integration, discursive quality and democratic control.  
Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Havinga, (2009); Fuchs, Kalfagianni, Clapp, & Busch, (2011);  corroborate Busch, 
(2011) findings that governance of global food and agriculture is being transformed due to globalisation of 
food systems. In light of this uncertain an unprecedented circumstance necessitated due to globalisation  
of food; two distinct surveys conducted by:(i) Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) between 2003 -
2005 dubbed “Private Standards in the United states and European Union markets for fruits and 
vegetables”, and (ii) a symposium on private agri-food governance conducted in 2011 revealed unique 
attributes related to private governance mechanism and their relation to food governance. The 
symposium rendered explicit that the rise of private governance mechanisms in the agri -food system 
poses the global constraints of food governance and challenges several fundamental values and core 
objectives of food governance. Of paramount importance, the observations made by Busch, (2009, 2010, 
2011) and Fuchs et al., (2011) under the symposium’s running theme of legitimacy in private standards.  
The symposium revealed three type of legitimacies notably; First, input or democratic legitimacy that is 
achieved by a decision making process. It focuses on the process of norm creation and asks if norms are 
accepted. Kaan & Liese, (2011:390) probe into the decision making process and the demands that this 
process needs to conform: first, by ensuring whether the relevant stakeholders are represented 
(participation); seeking whether the decision making can be held accountable (accountability) and 
whether decision making process is transparent (transparency). Second, by throughput legitimacy is 
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achieved if decision are made on the basis of a fair procedure (discursive quality) and third, output 
legitimacy  is established when a decision fulfils all the relevant claims (Mueller et al, 2009; Kaan & Liese, 
2011; Henson, 2011).  
On the other hand the two year (2003-2005) survey  by FAO (2007) reviewed extensively the available 
literature covering on various aspects of private standards. The summary of themes covered and the 
papers under each category covered: On general papers (22 papers); on methodology (8 papers); on 
impact of governmental regulations (16 papers); On impact of private and voluntary standards (6 papers), 
and case studies (87 papers). (FAO, 2005).  
The analysis of the FAO survey broadly drew the following conclusions that: (i) Phyto -sanitary standards 
are only found in the regulatory domain and hence no private phyto-sanitary standards were found, (ii) 
other standards (related to food safety, environmental and social) have a high degree of interaction 
between corporate, Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) and regulatory standards. In general, 
governments set minimum regulatory standards while food retail companies competing mainly on qua lity, 
position themselves above the regulatory minimum by introducing voluntary standards.  In areas of public 
interest such as food safety, governments may then be tempted to raise the minimum standards, forcing 
those companies that compete mainly on price also to adopt higher standards. This would have two 
resultant effects; first, differentiation by quality to the consumers willing to pay for higher quality 
segments of the market and second, proliferation of private standards would be minimal if the regu latory 
requirements were close to the maximum levels of food safety  thus reducing the perceived differences.  
(iii) Due to lack of inclusivity in legitimacy criterion, FAO observed that process based standards tend to be 
prescriptive instead of results based. Prescriptive standards set requirements on how products should be 
produced; this standards pose more difficulties for producers. Product standards  on the other hand are 
more results based than process standards. Adherence to product standards is much  easier than 
adherence to processes. (iv) The report also noted that compliance with private standards is more 
relevant for exports to the EU market than for exports to the US market. “What emerges from the 
literature is that the main constraint to exporting fresh produce to the US is the government’s phyto-
sanitary control system. The main constrains to exporting the EU is the proliferation of private standards”. 
To the EU, enforcement of phyto-sanitary regulations is considered to be less stringent. (v) Private 
standards with the highest potential impact on market opportunities for developing countries are the 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) and EureGap (FAO, 2007: 141-144). 
5 Foucault’s Governmentality theory and related Governance Theories 
The ubiquity of the term governance in contemporary discussions, in geo-political space, economic 
regulations and institutional framework warrants a keen review on governance theories and the akin 
theory of governmentality. Governance in the business and management  has been largely characterized 
as means that largely seek to maximize objectives of organizations by way of increasing profit or reducing 
costs for profit making or non-profit making organizations (Ezzamel & Reed, 2008). In this business, 
management model or epistemology, an organization  is viewed as an object stand independent of the 
subject (owner or agent); this brought forth the theories of transaction cost economics (TCE) theory as a 
cost minimizing initiative; principal agency (PAT) & property rights (PRT) theories as establishing the role 
of the owner and the agent and the rights and expectations amongst them as dictated by the nature of 
the governing contracts; while resource based view (RBV) and network theories (NT reviewi ng the role 
and type of resource to be applied (Ezzamel & Reed, 2008; Gachukia, 2015). In summary it is In summary, 
it is evident from the above discussion that the initial formulations of TCE , PAT, PRT, RBV & NT as 
developed previously from the works of Coase and Williamson are underpinned by some key notions. 
First, governance is a mechanism for minimizing transactions costs; and second, emphasis is taming 
opportunistic behavior. Third, monitoring and contracts are the means of securing effective governance. 
The emergence of global governance research agenda in the 1990s produced richer insights where 
governance was viewed to be better studied as a process and not as an institution, this analytical move 
made it easier to analyze changes in governance from the typologies of spot market, relational, modular 
and vertical forms of governance (Gereffi et al., 2005; Gibbon et al., 2008) while improving on the classical 
economic view of governance through markets and hierarchies. Despite the literature on global 
governance highlighting governance as a set of interrelated processes, it has also been criticized by 
Sending & Neumann, (2006)  among others that it does not provide first, the analytical tools to study 
these  governance processes. Second, studies of global governance have been accused of  perpetuating 
the similar views that they purport to rise above as their key findings without clarity on sovereignity, 
authority and legitimacy. Third, studies of global governance have been viewed with a non-value adding 
conception of power where an increase in the power and influence of non-state actors by fact are defined 
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as a simultaneous reduction in state power and authority; particularly, this criticism has been countered 
by looking at power and governance as created through interaction in networks and not necessarily 
having to be following the non-value adding assumption, but allowing for win-win situations on the chain 
actors (Hess, 2008). 
In light of the critique on value chain governance, a radical theme of conceptualization of gov ernance 
emerged in Michel Foucault works (1978, 1979, 1980, 1991). Foucault was interested in uncovering how 
governmentality underpins modern forms of political thought and action where in the previously in the 
16
th
 Century government the law and sovereignty but from the 18
th
 century onwards this emphasis shifted 
towards developing instruments of government (Ezzamel & Reed, 2008). 
 Foucault’s  governmentality theory thus promotes in mediating the challenges of governance beyond the 
state or governments and assist in improving the understanding of value chain governance discourse 
especially in the global scale. Foucault embarked then on investigations of the relationship between 
power and populations in the context of studies of political rule and political economy  with shift in 
mentalities underpinning how rulers have thought about their art and the different practices of rule they 
have devised and employed to perfect it. He referred to these mentalities and practices as 
‘governmentalities’ (Merlingen, 2011) or ‘mentalities’. The move to governmentality theory conceived as 
a tool to study networked governance beyond the state (Merlingen, 2011); in retrospect, the role of non-
state actors such as civil societies transcends them from passive object of being governed, to entities that 
are both an object and subject of governance; that is, how we think about governing others and ourselves 
in a wide range of contexts (Dean, 2010). As a consequence, this refined view proposes that “governance 
to be based primarily on regulatory, as opposed to legal, interventions, with the aim of forging alignments 
between the projects of citizens, firms and organizations and the socio-political objectives of public 
authorities” (Merlingen, 2011:151). 
The benefit of governmentality concept is viewed first as a mediator that regulates the excesses of private 
interests in regulations that brings about the constraint of legal pluralism. As such, governmentality 
concept does not prioritize state’s sovereignty and views governance beyond nations; this view promotes 
the regional and international networks and value chains. Second, Dean (2010) clarifies that the analysis 
of government based on governmentality focuses not simply on distribution of power but rather studies 
on the organized practices and ways that the institution governs itself. Thirdly, a central approach of 
governmentality according to Foucault concerns the mentalities or ways of thinking about government. To 
Lemke, (2002) government as a ‘conduct of conduct’(Hughes, 2001) is internal and external to the state 
taking into account the competencies within the state and what is not within it.  
6 Food Value chain Governance to Governmentality in Kenya’s Fresh Fruits and  
 Vegetables Exports 
In line to this mediating role, food value chain governance especially from emerging economies seen to be 
embracing it albeit unconsciously as reviewed in the fresh fruits and vegetable export sector in Kenya. The 
historical review of Kenya’s FFV development in six decades indicates that  transition of governance from 
spot markets in the 1960s to  hybrid forms of governance from the 1990s onwards. Dolan & Humphrey, 
(2000) survey on the linkages between food actors and exporters of FFV in Kenya, Zimbabwe and UK 
supermarkets with the underlying theme of governance in Global Commodity Chains (GCC) previous 
developed by Gereffi (1994), observed that: this mode of governance  relates to governance as a drive 
where much of the attention was the trade-off between producer driven versus buyer driven governance 
forms (Dolan, Humphrey, & Harris-Pascal, 1999); (Minot & Ngigi, 2004). Of particular importance to Dolan 
& Humphrey, (2000)  were the basic questions related to governance that they sought to answer, namely; 
which actors define what the chain requires, and how their requirements are transmitted to the various 
actors in the chain? This research establishes that these questions were further compounded with the 
entry of European supermarkets chains in the 1990s in the niche markets for fresh fruits and vegetables 
(FFV) which changed the entire scope of FFV value chain governance. 
 Since supermarkets being characterized to be in an oligopolistic competition, the need to position 
strategically through product differentiation emerged by way of offering unique products for their 
customers. Some of the key competitive strategies emphasized to exporters in order to win the lucrative 
orders with these chains included assurance of product quality, consistency, variety, value additions-
through processing, products combinations, packaging, enhancing reliability and pricing. With the entry of 
European supermarkets in the FFV supply chain also saw the proliferation of standards and stringent 
conditions being asked of the upstream agents and exporters for reasons related to due diligence as 
instigated by UK’s Food Safety Act 1990. Proliferation of standards necessarily brought about further 
changes in FFV chain governance with a huge attrition of smallholders farmers who were not compliant. 
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The underlying motive of the proliferation of standards was discerned to have both an assurance cum 
compliance objective to state agents and secondly, and more importantly is the motive of competitive 
advantage (Konefal, Mascarenhas, & Hatanaka, 2005; Ouma, 2010). This trend is what  is currently 
categorised as the new food regime that is emerging out of a combination of the concerns of consumers, 
increased supermarket power, and new forms of regulation (Smith, Lawrence, & Richards, 2010). 
Despite this governance background on Kenya’s horticultural  sector for last six decades, Kenya’s 
resilience and strategic global positioning in the horticultural sector has been aided  further  by the 
following: First, Nairobi’s location as a centre of air transport to various destinations especially Europe; 
second, preferential treatment and agreement under the Lomѐ Convention between African Caribbean 
Pacific Countries and the EU for concessionary access for Kenyan Vegetables to EU (Dolan & Humphrey, 
2000); Third, sustained demand  for horticultural products all year round; Fourth, Kenya’s close co -
operation with supermarkets and other market sources Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, (2010); Fifth, non-
interference by government in the commercial transactions; sixth, economies of  clustering which 
provides support in logistics, market penetration and market identity (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000).  
Seventh, formation of export processing villages (EPVs),  most of the small scale Kenyan exporters have 
under facilation of Horticulutural Crops Directorate (HCD) formerly Horticultural Crops Development 
Agency (HCDA) have been supported with shared and modern processing systems to meet the stringent 
regulatory requirements such as traceability, customers quality expectations, post harvesting processes 
such as product combinations, presentations and packaging, logistics and innovative ways that leverage 
on the industry’s asset specificity of Kenyan location, availability of  cheap labour, and the tropical climatic 
conditions favourable for the year round crop production.  
Eighth, due to competitiveness of Kenyan horticultural sector, market channels disintegrations -transfer of 
functions to new actors- have occurred  for competitive reasons; due to effectiveness reasons to reach 
out to targeted groups, efficiency reasons to decrease distribution costs from producer to final 
consumers, and equity reasons to strengthen the bargaining power of a group of actors  (Dijkstra, 
Meulenberg, & van Tilburg, 2001:229). In light of the Kenya’s position at the moment from the levels 
highlighted, Reardon, et al (2005) categorizes it under medium-large domestic category of firms. As is 
evident from the explanation by these authors, Kenyan exporters  success has been partly also associated 
with the formation of Fresh Fruits Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK) and collaboration with HCD and 
Kenya Plant health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS). 
Fresh Produce Exporters Associated of Kenya (FPEAK) is Kenya’s premier private association which 
represents growers, exporters and service providers in the horticultural industry. FPEAK provides a focal 
and coordination point for the horticultural export industry by supporting the growers and exporters 
through technical and marketing information and training, act as an information centre and run active 
lobbying and advocacy programmes to enhance the sectors competitiveness. FPEAK’s goals  include: to 
update and implement Kenya good agricultural practices to recognized international standards ; to 
influence enactment of a facilitative environment for horticulture industry; create awareness in the 
horticulture industry on market requirements, changes and regulations and to undertake continuous 
identification of market opportunities (FPEAK, 2014). Kenya through FPEAK has successfully l obbied for 
the formation of KenyaGap and Horticultural Ethical Business Initiative (HEBI). These bodies have become 
collective lobbying agencies for public grades and standards and also played a pivotal role in interpreting 
the global standards while advising their association members on the current trends and regulations that 
are to affect them.  
The formation of these homegrown standards –KenyaGAP, Kenya Standard 1758 and HEBI-   with 
international  benchmarking  characterises the Kenyan FFV supply chain as adopting what Tallontire, 
Opondo, Nelson, & Martin, (2009), consider as governance mechanisms beyond the vertical integration in 
what  they considered as horizontal governance. This is considered as an application of governance typical  
by interpretation of Foucault’s governmentality; that is, how the new regulatory institutions involve and 
affect others formally or informally by setting, monitoring, improving or implementing such stan dards at 
the national levels (Tallontire, et al., 2011). Private Standards Initiative (PSI) and governance through 
KenyaGap and HEBI relate to global standards’ good agricultural practice (GAP) and labour. Of a 
remarkable note, these private based standards have made considerations to governance by inclusion 
criterion of accountability, transparency and participation  (Fuchs et al., 2009). KenyaGap is an initiative 
that has been benchmarked with GlobalGAP and EurepGAP while HEBI is a Private Standard Initiative (PSI) 
that was developed in 2003 as a uniform social code of practice, which translated the UK’s Ethical Trading 
initiative (ETI) code in reference to Kenyan labour laws. 
In terms of legislative, judicial and executive governance of the two standards and their relation to 
Foucault’s governmentality, Tallontire et al  (2011) argue that: First, legislative governance is related to 
the origin of the standards, it is content, involvement and participation; second, judicial governance is 
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related to private standards with the concern on auditing procedures through compliance means, 
assessment and certification; and thirdly, executive governance of the two standards is considered from 
the fulfilment of the desired GAP and enforcement of labour standards. 
7 Conclusion 
The  trajectory of value chain governance has been  punctuated by factors such as economic transactions 
as related to complexity of transactions, ability to codify transactions, capability of the suppl y base and 
degree of coordination & power asymmetry; and determined by  complexity of information and 
knowledge transfer; codification of information and knowledge transmitted to actors in a transaction, and 
the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements of the transactions. This 
research establishes that significant to these types of governance structures is the role played by non 
state actors through private standards as witnessed in voluntary standards, accreditations and third party 
certifiers. In export of fresh fruits and vegetable especially from developing countries its noted that such 
standards such as phyto-sanitary standards and maximum fertiliser residue are only found in the 
regulatory domain of the state agencies; other standards related to food safety, environmental and social 
have a high degree of interaction between corporate, Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) and  more 
of the private or  voluntary regulatory standards. In general, governments set minimu m regulatory 
standards while food retail companies competing mainly on quality, position themselves above the 
regulatory minimum by introducing voluntary standards.  Due to lack of inclusivity in legitimacy criterion 
the rise in legal pluralism as an affect of proliferation of private standards especially to the EU market, 
this has characterised governance in this export sector as ‘cacophony of governance’ or ‘code of multiple 
colours’ to these agrifood supply chains; the implicit application of Foucault governmentality theory can 
be seen a moderator of this excesses. 
Specifically to the Kenyan’ case the application of Foucault governmentality theory as witnessed especially 
by FPEAK is its involvement as an industry stakeholder with the retail chains in promoting competitiveness 
of Kenya’s horticultural exports while moderating the excesses private interests in regulations by steering  
the adaptation of the KenyaGap standards from the larger GlobalGap standards. This approach also 
clarifies that the analysis of government based on governmentality focuses not simply on distribution of 
power but rather studies on the organized practices and ways that the Kenyan horticulture export 
institution governs itself. Foucault’s central approach of governmentality concern ing the mentalities or 
ways of thinking about government has promoted a synergistic development of the Kenyan oversight 
bodies of horticultural Crops Directorate and Kenya Plants Health Inspectorate service to partner in 
promoting what is best for the market while appreciating the role of non-state actors and private players 
and agencies’ role in promoting value in global economy.  
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